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Abstract
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and
Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We
also give suﬃcient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable
inside the stable set and the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the
core.
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1 Introduction
T h el a s t4 5y e a r sf o l l o w i n gt h ea p p e a r a n c eo ft h es e m i n a lw o r kb yG a l e
and Shapley (1962) have witnessed a rapidly growing literature in matching
theory studying the microfoundations of equilibrium in marriage and labor
markets, in college admissions and school choice problems, and recently in
organ exchange. Undoubtedly, stability, as the relevant notion of economic
eﬃciency, has invariably been one of the main concerns of researchers and
market designers in evaluating possible matching rules and procedures. While
many eﬀorts have in this literature been spent on characterizing the set of
stable matchings in a given market or for a given problem, an existential
question as to the validity of matching models with regard to the used sta-
bility concepts was delayed until it was very recently posed by Echenique
(2007): Can there be any set of matchings for a given society or a market
that is incompatible with the predictions of the matching model at hand with
respect to the employed stability notions? As Echenique (2007) points out,
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1the answer to this question is important when the preferences of individuals
are unknown as it allows one to know whether a matching theory at hand
has testable implications.
In this paper, we extend the inquiry of Echenique (2007) that he answers
in a marriage model under independent preferences to the marriage model
of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) that characterizes stable one-to-one matchings
under interdependent preferences. Following Echenique (2007), we say that
a set of matchings H in a given marriage market is rationalizable inside
the stable set if there exists a preference proﬁle such that the corresponding
stable set contains H. Similarly, we say that the set H is rationalizable inside
t h ec o r ei ft h e r ee x i s t sap r e f e r e n c ep r o ﬁle such that the corresponding core
contains H.
We show that Mumcu and Saglam’s (2008) marriage model with external-
ities is refutable, since for any society facing at least two diﬀerent matchings
there exists at least one collection of matchings, e.g. the set of all conceiv-
able matchings, that is not rationalizable inside the stable set or inside the
core. We also give suﬃcient characterization of (i) the set of matchings that
are rationalizable inside the stable set and (ii) the set of matchings that are
rationalizable inside the core. However, in spite of its refutability, the mar-
riage model with externalities is not always exactly identiﬁable,a st h e r em a y
exist many diﬀerent preference proﬁles that rationalize some collections of
matchings.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2,
we introduce our model that borrows from Mumcu and Saglam (2008). We
present our results in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
W ec o n s i d e ram a r r i a g em a r k e ti n v o l v i n gas e to fm e n ,M and a set of women,
W. We assume that M and W are nonempty, ﬁnite and disjoint, and satisfy
|M||W| ≥ 2, i.e. there exist at least three agents in the society and at least
one member from each gender. We denote a generic agent by i,ag e n e r i cm a n
by m, and a generic woman by w. We denote the society by N = M ∪ W.
A matching is a one-to-one function, μ,f r o mN to itself, such that for
each m ∈ M and for each w ∈ W we have μ(m)=w if and only if μ(w)=m.
Moreover, either μ(m) ∈ W or μ(m)=m, and similarly either μ(w) ∈ M
or μ(w)=w.I f μ(m)=w,t h e nm and w are matched to each other. If
2μ(i)=i,t h e ni is single. Let MN denote the set of all matchings in society
N.
Given any matching μ,l e tμm,w denote the matching at which (i) m and w
are a couple, i.e., μm,w(m)=w, (ii) their mates under μ,i ft h e ye x i s t ,b e c o m e
single, i.e., μm,w(μ(m)) = μ(m) if μ(m) / ∈ {m,w} and μm,w(μ(w)) = μ(w) if
μ(w) / ∈ {w,m}, and (iii) the marital status and the mates of all other agents
are preserved, i.e., μm,w(i)=μ(i) for all i/ ∈ {m,w,μ(m),μ(w)}.
Each agent has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over
the matchings in MN. Pi represents the preference relation of agent i,w h i l e
P =( Pi)i∈N denotes the preference proﬁl eo ft h es o c i e t y . W er e s p e c t i v e l y
write μ> i μ0 and μ ≥i μ0 to mean i strictly and weakly prefers μ to μ0.A
marriage market is a triple (M,W,P).
For any proﬁle P and any l ∈ {1,2,...,|MN|},l e tPi[l] denote the lth-
ranked matching from top in the ordering Pi of agent i.
We say that agent i individually blocks matching μ (via μi,i)i fμi,i >i
μ.A m a t c h i n g i s individually rational if it is not individually blocked by
any agent. For a given matching μ, (m,w) is a blocking pair if μ(m) 6= w,
μm,w >m μ and μm,w >w μ. Am a t c h i n gi sstable if it is individually rational
and if there are no blocking pairs. We denote the set of stable matchings
(the stable set) for the marriage market (M,W,P) by S(M,W,P).
Am a t c h i n gˆ μ dominates another matching μ via a blocking coalition
ˆ M ∪ ˆ W o fm e na n dw o m e ns u c ht h a tˆ μ( ˆ M ∪ ˆ W)= ˆ M ∪ ˆ W, ˆ μ(μ(ˆ m)) = μ(ˆ m)
for any ˆ m ∈ ˆ M if μ(ˆ m) / ∈ ˆ W ∪ {ˆ m}, ˆ μ(μ(ˆ w)) = μ(ˆ w) for any ˆ w ∈ ˆ W if
μ(ˆ w) / ∈ ˆ M ∪ {ˆ w}, ˆ μ(i)=μ(i) for any i/ ∈ ˆ M ∪ ˆ W ∪ μ( ˆ M ∪ ˆ W),a n dˆ μ> i μ
for all i ∈ ˆ M ∪ ˆ W.I nt h ea b o v ed e ﬁnition, members of the blocking coalition
can only be matched within the coalition. In addition, the previous mate, if
exists, of any agent in the blocking coalition becomes single under the new
matching unless he or she is inside the blocking coalition, too. Moreover, the
mates and marital status of all other agents are unchanged.
The set of all matchings dominated by no other matching is called the
core and denoted by C(M,W,P).
For a given society N,l e tH ⊂ MN be a subset of available matchings.
We say that H is rationalizable inside the stable set if there exists a pref-
erence proﬁle P such that H ⊂ S(M,W,P). Similarly, we say that H is
rationalizable inside the core if there exists a preference proﬁle P such that
H ⊂ C(M,W,P).
We simply note that a set H ⊂ MN is rationalizable inside the core
only if it is rationalizable inside the stable set. Echenique (2007) shows that
3under independent preferences MN is not rationalizable inside the stable set
(equalling the core) if the number of men and the number of women are the
same and at least three. We extend this result in our ﬁrst proposition.
3 Results
Proposition 1. For any society N satisfying |M||W| ≥ 2 and having strict
and interdependent preferences, MN is not rationalizable inside the stable
set (hence not rationalizable inside the core).
Proof. Suppose, MN is rationalizable inside the stable set by some pref-
erence proﬁle P;i . e . ,MN ⊂ S(M,W,P).L e t μs denote the matching at
which every agent is single. Pick any (m,w) ∈ M ×W.D e n o t eb yμs
m,w the
matching at which (m,w) is the unique married couple. Then, μs
m,w >m μs
and μs
m,w >w μs by the assumed stability of μs
m,w. This implies that μs can-
not be in S(M,W,P), a contradiction.
P r o p o s i t i o n1s h o w st h a tt h ew h o l es e to fm a t c h i n g sc a n n o tb er a t i o n a l -
izable, hence our matching model is testable. Given the refutability of our
model, the next step is to check whether any proper subset of MN can be
rationalizable. When the preferences are independent, Echenique (2007) is
able to show that any set of matchings in which no agent is matched with
t h es a m ep a r t n e ru n d e rd i ﬀerent matchings is rationalizable. He also shows
that in general the preferences that rationalize a rationalizable set of match-
ings are not unique. Below, we establish similar results under interdependent
preferences. But, we have to ﬁrst introduce the following deﬁnition.
Given a society N and an agent i ∈ N,m a t c h i n g sμ,μ0 ∈ MN are called
connected by agent i if μ(i)=μ0(i) and unconnected by agent i otherwise.
Proposition 2. For any society N having strict and interdependent pref-
erences, consider H ⊂ MN such that no pair of matchings μk,μ l ∈ H are
connected by any agent in N.T h e nH is rationalizable inside the stable set
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distinct preference proﬁles that rationalize it.
Proof. Consider any society N having strict and interdependent preferences.
Pick any H = {μ0,μ 1,μ 2,...,μ Z} ⊂ MN for some Z ∈ {1,2,...,|MN|−2}
such that no pair of matchings μk,μ l ∈ H are connected by any agent in N.
Consider ﬁrst the preference proﬁle P such that for all i ∈ N, Pi[k]=μk−1 for
all k ∈ {1,2,...,|H|}. Then, it is easy to check that H ⊂ S(M,W,P).E a c h
individual in N can independently order the ﬁrst |H| matchings in |H|! dis-
tinct ways while he or she can order the remaining matchings in (|MN|−|H|)!
distinct ways. Hence, we obtain the lower bound on the number of prefer-
ences that rationalize H inside the stable set. To prove the second part of
the proposition, let |H| ≤ N. Enumerate agents from 1 to N.C o n s i d e rt h e
preference proﬁle P such that Pi[k]=μl with l =( k + i − 2)mod |H| for
all i ∈ {1,...,|H|} and for all k ∈ {1,2,...,|H|} whereas Pi[k] ∈ H for all
i ∈ {|H|+1,...,N} and for all k ∈ {1,2,...,|H|} with each Pi[k] being dis-
tinct. Then, it is easy to check that H ⊂ C(M,W,P).N o t i c et h a tt h e r ea r e ¡ N
|H|
¢
distinct ways to select |H| agents from the society. The ﬁrst |H| match-
ings in the preference orderings of the ﬁrst |H| agents are completely tied
to each other, so there are |H|! distinct ways to represent their preference
ordering as a group. Each of the remaining N −|H| agent can independently
have any of |H|! distinct orderings of the ﬁrst |H| matchings drawn from H.
Besides, any agent in N can independently order the remaining (|MN|−|H|)
matchings in (|MN| − |H|)! distinct ways.
Example 1. Consider M = {m1,m 2} and W = {w1}. The three possible
matchings are denoted by μ1, μ2,a n dμ3.A tμ1 and μ2, w1 is matched to m1
and m2 respectively, while at μ3 every agent is single. Let the preferences be
Pm1 = μ2μ1μ3, Pm2 = μ1μ2μ3,a n dPw1 = μ1μ2μ3.I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a t
S(M,W,P)=C(M,W,P)={μ1,μ 2}.T h e s e t s H1 = {μ1}, H2 = {μ2},
H3 = {μ3},a n dH4 = {μ1,μ 2} all satisfy the connectedness hypothesis in
the above proposition. Since, |Hk| ≤ 3=N for all k ∈ {1,2,3,4},a n yHk
is rationalizable inside the core (hence inside the stable set). Moreover, one
can easily calculate for example that the set H1, contained by the core, can
5be rationalized inside the stable set by at least 8 distinct preference proﬁles
and inside the core by at least 24 distinct preference proﬁles.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have showed that Mumcu and Saglam’s (2008) marriage
model with externalities is refutable, and hence it has testable implications
(Proposition 1). We have also established that if a collection of matchings,
such as the set of all matchings, is not rationalizable inside the stable set (or
inside the core even when the number of matchings in the collection is less
t h a nt h en u m b e ro fa g e n t si nt h es o c i e t y ) ,t h e ns o m ea g e n t sm u s th a v et h e
same mate under more than one matching (Proposition 2). We should here
emphasize that our second result simply characterizes collections of match-
ings that are not rationalizable. However, a suﬃciency result such as Propo-
sition 2 is still valuable, as already remarked by Echenique (2007) in his
framework of independent preferences, since it has an important implication
for empirical tests of matching theory at hand, requiring some pairs of agents
to be identiﬁed under more than one matching in the available data. On the
other hand, Proposition 2 also implies that the refutable matching model
of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) dealing with interdependent preferences is not
exactly identiﬁable,a st h e r em a ye x i s tm a n yd i ﬀerent preference proﬁles that
rationalize some sets of matchings.
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